We examine speculative attacks in a controlled laboratory environment featuring continuous time, size asymmetries, and varying amounts of public information. Attacks succeeded in 233 of 344 possible cases. When speculators have symmetric size and access to information: (a) weaker fundamentals increase the likelihood of successful speculative attacks and hasten their onset, and (b) contrary to some theory, success is enhanced by public access to information about either the net speculative position or the fundamentals. The presence of a larger speculator further enhances success, and experience with large speculators increases small speculators' response to the public information.
Introduction
For more than 30 years, recurrent currency crises have confounded policy makers, and have challenged economic theorists to find explanations. The "First Generation" models, (e.g., Krugman, 1979; Flood and Garber, 1984) gave insight into the Latin American and other crises of the 1970s and early 1980s, but had difficulty accounting for later events such as the 1992 British Pound crisis. Theorists responded with "Second Generation" models of self-fulfilling crises (e.g., Obstfeld, 1995 Obstfeld, , 1996 , leading to quite different policy implications. The 1997-98 crisis in East Asia and other recent events inspired "Third Generation" models that focus on financial market imperfections. Most Second and Third Generation models feature strategic interactions among speculators and government agencies, and many have multiple equilibria.
International finance economists now have an embarrassment of riches. With so many models to choose from, it is hard to trust the policy implications of any one of them; indeed, the next currency crisis might
inspire Fourth Generation models with still different implications. Empirical work is essential to understand the range of applicability of current models. Traditional econometric methods help, but are limited by a mismatch between data and theory. Key variables, such as speculators' information and expectations, are not observable in the field so inferences are limited. The historical data, of course, can exhibit at most one equilibrium at a time, so the existence of multiple equilibria remains a matter of conjecture.
The laboratory offers an underexploited source of data for examining the robustness of theoretical predictions. In the lab, one can observe and even control key variables including the information available to players, can replicate a given scenario many times, and can make rigorous causal inferences. Of course, laboratory markets are much smaller scale than in the field, and one must investigate external validity. Due to their very different strengths, laboratory and field data are complements, not substitutes.
The present paper describes one of the first laboratory investigations of speculative attacks. The laboratory game is not closely tailored to any particular theoretical model. It is intended to provide evidence not otherwise obtainable that can help sharpen the issues, inform econometric analysis of field data, and refine existing models.
Unlike most current models and experiments, time is continuous in our laboratory game. During each trial, the strength of fundamentals can deteriorate moment by moment, and the speculators can switch back and forth between passive mode and attack mode. Such asynchronous decisions by human subjects illuminate aspects of the coordination problem that are invisible in static models, but that may be crucial in the decentralized 24 hour global foreign exchange market.
The experiment focuses on a question central to many of the Second and Third Generation models: when can speculators coordinate on their preferred equilibrium, an attack that forces devaluation? The question is particularly acute when the speculators are uncertain about the strength of fundamentals, or are uncertain about what the other speculators are doing. We examine whether public information about the fundamentals and about other players' choices affects coordination and, hence, the probability of a successful attack.
In some trials we include one speculator able to take a larger position and sometimes with better information on the fundamentals. It is widely believed that a single large player, George Soros, was essential in coordinating the successful 1992 attack on the British pound, and a branch of the theoretical literature justifies that belief. The experiment also examines some predictions from that theoretical literature.
Section 2 surveys some relevant theoretical models, some field evidence, and the handful of relevant laboratory studies. Section 3 offers some simple theoretical perspectives and some theoretical predictions that are testable in the laboratory. Section 4 describes our laboratory environment and treatments.
Section 5 presents the results. When feasible, attacks succeed more often than not. With speculators of symmetric size and access to information, speculative attacks are more often successful and occur sooner when fundamentals are weaker. Contrary to some theory, public access to information about either the net speculative position or the fundamentals also enhances success. The presence of a larger speculator further enhances success, and experience with large speculators increases small speculators' response to the public information. However, giving the large speculator increased size or better information does not significantly strengthen his impact. Section 6 puts the findings into broader perspective.
Some Related Literature
As just noted, there are already several generations of models designed to explain foreign currency crises. Henderson and Salant (1978) is an important precursor, dealing with the interaction between the speculators and government policies. The First Generation models, formulated by Krugman (1979) and Flood and Garber (1984) , focused on economies where the fundamentals are inconsistent with preserving a fixed exchange rate. This is the case when a sizable fiscal deficit is monetized and the money supply increases faster than money demand under a fixed exchange rate, inducing a crisis. In the absence of uncertainty, the crisis hits and the currency devalues when the shadow exchange rate (i.e., the exchange rate that would prevail if the exchange rate were allowed to float) is equal to the official exchange rate.
The First Generation models provide a useful interpretation of crises triggered by fiscal weaknesses, as in
Latin America in the 1970s-80s. However, the financial instability in Europe in the early 1990s, including the 1992 attack on the British Pound, shifted attention to the fragility of equilibrium under a fixed exchange rate. The role of financier George Soros in the 1992 attack also raised questions regarding speculators' behavior when some of them have market power. "Second Generation" models, formulated
by Obstfeld (1995 Obstfeld ( , 1996 , feature self-fulfilling crises and multiple equilibria. Obstfeld (1995) , for instance, extends the Barro-Gordon framework and models a policy maker who faces a trade-off between credibility and flexibility when devaluation entails a fixed cost. The potential for self-fulfilling crises stems from circularity: the behavior of the policy maker depends on prior private sector expectations of inflation and depreciation. These expectations, however, depend on market perceptions of the policy maker's behavior. In such circumstances, an increase in the cost of abandoning the peg may increase the likelihood of a crisis (Flood and Marion, 1999) , and toughness can be counterproductive (Drazen and Masson, 1994) .
Later events, especially the 1997-98 crisis in East Asia, led to "Third Generation" models. Their focus is the role of balance sheet factors and financial sector weaknesses, as well as the possibility of bailouts by international financial institutions, central banks, and governments. Leading examples include Krugman (1999), Corsetti et al. (1999) , Chang and Velasco (1999) and Dooley (1997) .
The growing dynasty of models attests to the rich interplay between economic theory and economic events. The downside is that models seem to "chase" the last crisis in an attempt to provide ex-post explanations. Of course, the research has also identified some ex-ante vulnerabilities and suggested ways to prevent or mitigate crises; see e.g. Obstfeld (1998) .
A common thread of the Second and Third Generation models is the role of public information and the existence of multiple equilibria. Morris and Shin (1998) resolve multiplicity by introducing private information via the global games approach of Carlsson and Van Damme (1993) . When privately informed speculators make simultaneous choices, one obtains a unique equilibrium for almost every value of the fundamentals. Much of the subsequent theoretical literature investigates when private information does or does not eliminate multiple equilibria (e.g., Angeletos and Werning, 2006) .
Several later authors, surveyed in Allegret and Cornand (2005) , extend the static Morris and Shin model to examine policy issues. There has been a widespread consensus in the policy community, bolstered by theoretical models such as Heinemann and Illing (2002) and by some evidence such as Bannier (2004) , that greater transparency (i.e., better information on fundamentals and perhaps on speculative behavior) will discourage speculative attacks. Using a slightly different model, Bannier and Heinemann (2005) confirm the consensus except in some circumstances when prior beliefs about fundamentals are optimistic, in which case a lesser degree of transparency will minimize the probability of speculative attacks. The survey finds other exceptions and concludes that central bank transparency has an ambiguous effect theoretically (and empirically).
Noting that "the coordination problem among investors is at the heart of most second-and thirdgeneration models of currency crises," Corsetti et al. (2004) (2007) reach a similar conclusion in a discrete time dynamic extension of global games where players can learn from earlier periods. For our purposes, their most interesting conclusion is that "equilibrium dynamics can alternate between phases of distress and phases of tranquility, even without changes in the fundamentals." An earlier paper, Chamley (2003) , also highlights the dynamic tension between delaying to learn more and moving quickly to ensure a share of the gains if an attack is successful.
Guimaraes ( Another theoretical approach begins with Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003) . They build a rather complex model of bubbles and crashes in which a continuum of speculators gradually become aware of a negative shock to fundamentals, but don't know how many others are already aware. Rochon (2006) incorporates this information process into a currency crisis model. In that model, the informed speculators delay attacking longer when fundamentals are stronger and deteriorate more slowly, and when speculators face higher opportunity costs and become informed more slowly.
Evidence on the role of large players in contemporary foreign exchange markets includes the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (1998) report that the top five trading firms account for 31% of market share.
Recent surveys of dealers (Cheung and Wong, 2000; Cheung and Chinn, 2001; Cheung et al., 2004) indicate that trading in some currencies is dominated by a few big players. Respondents attribute deviation of FX rates from fundamental values mainly to "excess speculation" and "institutional customer or hedge fund manipulation." Many observers agree that George Soros' hedge fund, followed by other investors, precipitated devaluation of the British pound and Italian lira in the 1992 EMS crisis. Some argue that the hedge funds led the way in the rapid devaluation of the Japanese yen in late 1998. It would seem that their high degree of leverage allows hedge funds to influence the price of thinly traded currencies (Economist, October 10, 1998; Sesit and Pacelle, 1998) . On the other hand, Eichengreen et al. (1998) and others argue that hedge funds did not exacerbate the 1997-98 Asian currency crises.
We are aware of only a few relevant laboratory experiments. The first, reported in Heinemann, Nagel and Ockenfels (2004, henceforth HNO) examines the static symmetric model of Morris and Shin (1998) .
Subjects play the role of speculators in a series of simultaneous move coordination games, with public or private information about the strength of fundamentals. Contrary to the key global games prediction that private information resolves multiplicity, the speculators coordinate more successfully and achieve higher payoffs with public information. Consistent with the basic comparative static predictions, speculative attacks succeed more often when fundamentals are weaker and when speculation costs are lower.
A second study by Costain, Heinemann and Ockenfels (2005, henceforth CHO) reports bimodal outcomes when traders move sequentially, as predicted in the Costain (2004) model. Cornand (2006) extends the static HNO setup and finds that speculative attacks succeed more often with two public signals than with one public and one private signal. Arikawa et al. (2006) also extend HNO and find, consistent with Corsetti et al. (2004) , that small players are more likely to attack when a large player is present.
Do similar results hold in continuous time? Huberman and Glance (1993) argue that continuous time can make coordination more difficult because choices are asynchronous-it's not only what you do but when you do it. In the only other continuous coordination laboratory game we know, Brunnermeier and Morgan (2004, henceforth BM) 1 examine "clock games" that end when the third of six players exits, and those three players receive a payoff that increases continuously in the exit time. The authors report that, consistent with the unique symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibrium, players exit sooner when they have better information about other players' choices and clock settings.
Theoretical Considerations
This section spotlights the main issues by describing speculators' activities and writing down a simple stylized model. It then poses a set of researchable questions.
When speculators think that monetary authorities may not be able to maintain a fixed exchange rate for some specific currency (against, say, the US dollar), they can "attack" by selling the currency short, hoping to profit from the difference between the exchange rate before and after devaluation. Devaluation occurs when in aggregate speculators' net short position exceeds some critical level that represents the monetary authorities' willingness and ability to defend the currency (the so-called "fundamentals"). While We believe that all the laboratory studies mentioned here were independently initiated at about the same time as (or after) our own except for HNO, which came first. waiting for devaluation, the speculators incur ongoing costs. The main explicit cost is the interest rate differential: authorities often defend a currency by raising the interest rate hundreds or even thousands of basis points above the US dollar rate. The main implicit cost is the risk that the authorities might impose capital controls, or might otherwise penalize speculators taking large short positions.
A Simple Model
Many of the strategic issues are captured in the following continuous time coordination game. At each moment t in [0, 1], each player i with mass (or position size) m i can switch between passive mode, denoted a i (t) = 0, and attack mode a i (t) = 1. 2 Let B(t) = ∑ i a i (t) m i be the total mass of players in attack mode at time t, and let T(t) represent the threshold mass, i.e., the exogenous strength of fundamentals.
Normalize payoff flows so that players earn 100 per unit time in passive mode (an opportunity cost that represents the speculators' ongoing costs noted above) and, when B(t) < T(t), earn 0 in attack mode. Let t* = min{1, inf {t: B(t) ≥ T(t) }} represent the moment that the speculative attack succeeds, or the end of the period if the attack never succeeds. The attackers receive a lump-sum payoff of L>0 when the attack succeeds. After that point, all players earn the opportunity cost. Set the discount factor to 1 for simplicity.
Thus, using the Heaviside function θ(x) = 1 if x >0 and θ(x) = 0 otherwise, the payoff for player i can be written as Some caveats are in order before discussing the equilibria of these games and the testable implications.
The threshold T(t) is exogenous, i.e., the monetary authority is not a strategic participant, in order to keep a sharp focus on coordination and information issues. The games suppress two margins that sometimes play a minor role in the literature: the size of the devaluation is fixed at L, and each player either attacks fully or not at all.
At any fixed time t, the (static) equilibrium correspondence depends on the strength of the fundamentals The question then is, when will the players be able to coordinate an attack to achieve the higher payoffs in a devaluation equilibrium?
2 A careful formal model would impose the assumption that the ai functions are right-continuous, or at least measurable. Continuous time introduces some interesting complications. Player i would find it in her immediate interest to join a speculative attack whenever she is pivotal, i.e., at any time t such that
Typically several passive players would find themselves as pivotal at the same time, so they play a preemption game: as with patrons of a burning nightclub or depositors in a bank run, the reward goes to those who move first. The incentives are in the opposite direction when a player is not pivotal. It is in her interest to wait for the other players to attack (and let them forego the opportunity cost of 100 per unit time) until she becomes pivotal. Thus the direct incentive switches abruptly from free riding (waiting) to preemption (rushing) when a player becomes pivotal.
3
The efficient equilibrium in the continuous time game (from the players' perspective, not the Central Bank's perspective!) is for all players to switch simultaneously into attack mode at the first time t* that T(t*)
Of course, there are many other equilibria, e.g., "sunspot" equilibria in which a sufficient mass of players attacks at an arbitrary t* such that T(t*) ≤ M.
Researchable Questions
In practice, one wonders how the players might learn to coordinate on any equilibrium. Some of our evidence suggests a home-grown signaling process. When B(s) is publicly observable, a player switching into attack mode signals to the other players currently in passive mode that they are now closer to being pivotal, which may encourage them also to switch. This signal is low cost if the switch is brief. Such signaling episodes would be observed as pulses in which B increases rapidly and either reaches the threshold T so the attack succeeds, or else tops out below T and then rapidly declines. Angeletos et al. (2007) obtain such pulses in dynamic equilibrium.
The interesting questions now may be posed as follows.
Fundamentals. Is the probability of a successful attack a decreasing function of T(t)?
The static Nash equilibrium correspondence allows for that possibility but does not require it. Recall that the global games approach predicts a sharp transition from probability 0 to probability 1. To expand slightly on the comments at the end of the previous section, HNO obtain a more gradual transition using different fixed levels of T in different trials, while CHO confirm an almost linear transition with simultaneous choice but persistent bimodality with sequential choice. By contrast, our laboratory design will allow us to evaluate the effects of continuously changing fundamentals. 
The Experiment
To answer such questions, we conducted an experiment at UCSC's LEEPS lab using a custom-built software platform called EvTech that supports asynchronous (i.e., continuous time) binary choice games.
A typical session lasted 90 minutes and involved fewer than a dozen inexperienced human subjects recruited by email from a campus-wide pool of undergraduate volunteers. Subjects silently read the instructions, reproduced in Appendix A, and then listened to an oral summary by the conductor. After a quiz and a couple of practice rounds, they usually played 45 periods, of which most were the Speculative Attack game described in more detail below. Each subject received $2 (or $3 in some sessions) in cash per 1000 points earned over all periods, plus a $5 showup fee. On average the cash payment was $20.90, and the vast majority of subjects earned between $15 and $30.
During each period, each subject privately viewed a player screen display similar to the one shown in Figure 1 . Except for one condition (explained in the Symmetry item below), each subject knew that other subjects saw the same information on their screens.
Each subject had two buttons, labeled Red (corresponding to the passive mode) and Blue (the attack mode), and switched mode by clicking the button not greyed out. In Speculative Attack periods, the payoff rates were exactly as in the theoretical discussion above: 0 for Blue prior to success, and 100 per period for Red (the opportunity cost) and for either mode after a successful attack. It was announced publicly (and written on the whiteboard) that players in Blue mode at the time that an attack succeeded received a bonus of L=100 points. The "Activity Payoff Graph" portion of the screen showed in real time the payoff rates as blue and red lines, and also showed (as a green area) the player's profits earned so far. At the end of each period, the subject could see her current period and previous period payoffs, and the average payoffs to both activities, as in the right side panels in Figure 1 .
Continuously updated panels as in the upper left in Figure 1 allowed players in the baseline treatment to observe the mass B(s) of players in attack mode and the threshold T(s) for success, for all times s from the beginning of the period up to the current time t. More precisely, the program refreshed the screen displays every "tick", set at half a second (500 msec), and each period lasted 90 seconds. Key treatments include the following.
Treatments

Number of players and experience.
The number of human subjects varied across sessions from 4 to 11, and was known to everyone. The last two sessions used only subjects with experience in a prior session of the experiment; the other sessions used only inexperienced subjects.
Fundamentals. The threshold T(t)
always started out at 110% of total player mass M at t=0, fell linearly to a predetermined final value at a predetermined time, and remained at that final value for the rest of the period. 4 Final values and times ranged from 50% of M at 15 seconds to 105% at 60 seconds. Of course, attacks cannot succeed when T(t) always remains above 100%, and the 16 such periods are excluded from the analysis. 5 The vast majority of fundamentals paths lie between a decrease to 90% of M within 45 seconds, and a decrease to 60% within 30 seconds. The path changed each period (to discourage uninteresting focal point equilibria), and varied across blocks orthogonally to the other treatment variables (to sharpen statistical inferences).
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This treatment of fundamentals is perhaps reminiscent of First Generation models, except that (due to our focus on the "intermediate case") we always stabilize T above the level m where the no-attack equilibrium disappears. 
Results
Overview
Before testing the hypotheses, we gain perspective by examining how players behaved in a single trading period, say the 19 th period in the last session. In that block (periods 16-20), all players observed neither the blue line B(t), the weight of players in attack mode, nor the grey line T(t), the threshold weight or strength of fundamentals. In period 19, player #4 had the Soros role, with weight 5.
As shown in Figure 2 , the threshold dropped from 110% of total mass M ( = 5+8*1 = 13) to 50% of M at t=45 seconds. In the first 20 seconds or so players remained in passive mode except for brief solo attacks by player #5 and player #4 (Soros). Then several small players successively switched into attack mode and remained there for several seconds, but the attack reached a plateau and began to subside by t=27 sec. At t=41, with much weaker fundamentals, the attack was renewed and it succeeded at t*=45.5 when The other 343 periods differed in many respects. Some sessions saw many periods with several unsuccessful attack pulses, while other sessions (including the last) usually saw attacks succeed on the first pulse. Some sessions had relatively few successful attacks, but in one session attacks usually succeeded almost as soon as they became feasible. Summaries for all periods in Figure 2 format cannot be included here but are available on request. shows that the success rate in this case is under 10% in all information treatments. When speculators can see both B(t) and T(t), the success rate climbs steeply as fundamentals weaken, e.g., it is over 70% when T = 0.75M , that is, when ¾ of the speculators are required. By contrast, the success rate at the same threshold is only about 20% when speculators see neither B(t) nor T(t). Players achieve intermediate success rates when they can see one but not both of the lines.
The figure suggests affirmative answers to the first two research questions: the probability of a successful attack does seem to be a decreasing function of the threshold, and seems enhanced by more public information. But the figure doesn't indicate whether the differences are significant, it conflates rapidly moving with slowly moving fundamentals, and it omits the asymmetric periods. 6 More quantitative tests are in order.
Performance Variables, Explanatory Variables, and Estimation Techniques
The first two parts of our quantitative data analysis treat each period as a single observation, and examine four measures of performance.
1. Success: this dummy variable =1 iff there is a successful attack that period. number τ of seconds. The τ and tick variables are right-censored by the end of the period when t*=90, i.e., when no attack succeeds that period. To explain the first performance measure, success, we estimate the Logit model
Minimum gap, Mingap = min{T(t) -B(t):
where y i is the period i success dummy taking the value of 1 or 0, while x i is a vector of explanatory variables, and β is the corresponding vector of coefficients. To check robustness and to offer a different perspective on the data, we re-examine the time to success τ using the Cox proportional hazard model (PHM)
The variable h i (t) is the hazard rate (or, in the present context, the success rate), the probability density that a speculative attack is successful at time t conditional on the explanatory variables in the vector x i (and conditional on no earlier success, so we can use t and τ interchangeably). The baseline hazard rate h 0 (t) is h i (t) when x i = 0. One advantage of PHM is that it is semiparametric and imposes no functional form on the baseline function h 0 (t).
Tests of Fundamentals and Information
Is the probability of a successful attack a decreasing function of T(t)? We now sharpen this first question as: do the variables T(t) or Steep have a significant impact on the performance variables in the
appropriate direction? Likewise, the second researchable question-Does the probability of a successful attack increase or decrease when players have better public information about B and T?-can be sharpened as: do the variables DB and DT significantly impact the performance variables in either direction? Table 2 collects the evidence from the 193 periods with symmetric players. The second column reports the logit estimates for the performance variable Success. The probability of a successful attack does significantly increase when the threshold and attack mass variables are observable and when the fundamentals deteriorate rapidly. Indeed, a steep decline in the fundamentals increases the log odds of success by almost three. We also considered the effect of the interaction terms DT*Steep and DT*DB, but omit reporting them because neither is highly significant in any specification or even marginally significant in most specifications.
The Tobit estimation results for the other three performance variables are shown in the next three columns, and they all reinforce the implications of the Logit estimates. For instance, the time to success (τ)
is significantly less when players see the T and the B lines and when T drops steeply. Each dummy variable reduces the time to success by about 15% (e.g., 0.88 /5.87 ≈ 0.15 for DB). Again, the estimates indicate that the 'Steep' dummy has an even larger impact.
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The Type I extreme-value distribution function, also known as the log Weibull distribution function, is given by F(w) = exp [- So far the regression results indicate that information about the fundamentals and speculative activity hastens the occurrence of a successful attack. What happens when no successful attack is observed?
The Mingap Tobit regression again indicates that all three explanatory variables foster speculation and help narrow the gap to success. The Bluearea Tobit regression likewise shows that the same variables reduce the time spent in fruitless speculation.
In the sixth column, the PHM coefficient signs are reversed relative to the Tobit model (because the PHM estimates the success rate instead of the time to success) but the fitted models again reinforce each other.
Other things equal, displaying the strength of fundamentals (DT=1) increases the probability of a successful attack per unit time by an estimated factor of e 1.08 ≈ 2.94, or 194%. Likewise, displaying the overall speculative position (DB=1) more than triples the probability of success (e 1.29 ≈ 3.65) and steeply declining fundamentals (Steep=1) increases it sixfold (e 1.85 ≈ 6.36).
The PMH also allows us to examine directly the effect of the time-varying fundamental T(t), as reported in the remaining columns of Table 2 . Of course, the Steep dummy is now redundant and is omitted and, due to the way the data are recorded, the time variable is expressed in ticks rather than in seconds. In column 7, both information dummies DT and DB maintain their significance and approximate magnitudes in the presence of T(t), although their relative size changes. The coefficient estimate -7.04 implies that deterioration of fundamentals causes a dramatic increase in the probability of a successful attack. For example, the success probability doubles when T decreases by just 10% of speculators' total capacity M (since e (-0.10)*(-7.04) ≈ 2.02).
What happens when players can't observe the threshold, that is, when DT = 0? Define AT(t) as the average over all draws of T(t) used in the experiment. Up to sampling error, this variable captures an individual player's previous experience in observing the fundamentals. Columns 8 and 9 report results based on, respectively, only sessions with DT = 0 and all the sessions. The results suggest that subjects respond appropriately to such experience, especially in the 66 periods with DT = 0, but (perhaps due to sampling error) the AT(t) coefficient estimates aren't quite significant; their p-values are 0.37 in the DT = 0 subset and 0.27 overall.
Some of the theoretical work suggests that the speed at which fundamentals deteriorate is as important as the level (Flood and Garber, 1984; Guimares, 2006; Rochon, 2006) . To investigate, we form the Table 2 show that the deterioration rate of fundamentals has the predicted effect but it is not statistically significant. We note that if T is excluded from the regression, then exp(-w)].
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Tprime has the expected sign and is significant. Thus, our data do not support the extreme view that the deterioration rate of fundamentals is all that matters.
We also conducted several robustness checks, omitted from Table 2 to conserve space. Players in a given session might be especially good or bad at coordinating, and this could affect the results, so we reran all regressions using session fixed effects. None of the estimated effects changes sign or loses significance, and some estimated effects become stronger. A few of the session fixed effects are large (e.g., session exp101 has a very large fixed effect for Success, suggesting excellent coordination) but, except for some of the Bluearea and Mingap tobits, very few are highly significant. We also ran several alternative PHM specifications. Including a time trend in some cases slightly increased the estimated magnitude and significance of the T, AT, or Tprime variables, but never enough to change the qualitative conclusions, and the time trend itself was never significant in the presence of these variables.
Tests of Asymmetry
Does the presence of a player with larger mass or better information increase the probability of a successful attack? To address this third researchable question, we define the following dummy explanatory variables: Table 3 reports regressions for the asymmetric sessions, which include 47 symmetric periods as well as 151 periods with Soros. The specifications are similar to those in Table 2 , augmented by the 'Soros' variable and the more significant interactions. The variable 'BigSoros' is insignificant in all specifications and so is dropped from the reported results. One possible interpretation, consistent with the theoretical results of Corsetti et al. (2004) , is that what matters is Soros' mere presence, not his exact trading capacity. The 'OST' variable is also insignificant in all specifications and omitted from the table.
The results in Table 3 confirm that Soros has a real impact. The "Soros" dummy variable is significant at least at the 10% level in each regression, and always indicates that speculative attacks are more likely to succeed and come sooner when Soros is present. For example, the third column of Panel A indicates that Soros speeds the time to success by almost 30% (from 1.94/6.76 ≈ 0.287). Even when the attack is not successful, the Mingap and pressure estimates in columns 4 and 5 indicate that the presence of Soros significantly narrows the gap from success and adds to speculative pressure.
The impact of fundamentals T(t) is less in Table 3 than in Table 2 but is still quite strong. For example, the devaluation probability increase for a 10% deterioration in fundamentals is 65% (based on the -5.01 coefficient estimate in the last column of Table 3 ), about two-thirds as strong as in Table 2 . Steeply declining fundamentals seldom appear in the asymmetric data, so the steep dummy has more erratic coefficients and usually lower significance than in Table 2 . Table 3 , like Table 2 , reports that both informational dummy variables significantly increase the probability of an attack, hasten its onset, increase speculative pressure, and reduce the shortfall of unsuccessful attacks. However, in Table 3 most of the direct effects are stronger and they often interfere with each other. The Tobit time to success estimates, for example, indicate separate reductions of about 18% and 36% respectively for PT (the counterpart of DT from Table 2 ) and DB, but an offset of 12% in the combination. Thus when speculators observe both speculative activity and fundamentals, the average time to success declines by about [1.24 + 2.42 -0.82]/6.76 ≈ 18% + 36% -12% = 42%.
The interaction term DB*Soros is insignificant in many of the regressions, but comes up marginally significant in two of the three timing regressions, with a sign again indicating an offset of the level effects.
Looking once more at the Tobit time to success estimates, we note that the separate effects are 36% and 29% reductions respectively for observing speculative activity and for Soros' presence, but the coefficient estimate for DB*Soros implies an offset of 1.55/6.76 ≈ 23% and thus a combined effect of about 36% + 29% -23% = 42%. In comparing these estimates to those from Table 2 , the main puzzle is the large impact for DB (estimated at 36%) when Soros is absent. Perhaps players somehow become more attuned to signaling in sessions where Soros is usually present.
Again to check robustness, we re-ran the Table 3 estimates allowing for session fixed effects. This generally strengthens the results slightly, without changing the qualitative results. We also tried the AT and Tprime variables on the asymmetric data, obtaining results a bit noisier but otherwise similar to those reported in the previous subsection. These additional results are not reported for brevity but are available from the authors.
Tests of Coordination
The last column of Table 3 amount of speculation. Stronger fundamentals (when observable) deter attacks and the presence of Soros encourages attacks. Table 4 investigates a question related both to coordination and to asymmetry. The model of Corsetti et al. (2004) emphasizes Soros' ability to exploit his signaling strength by attacking earlier than other speculators. On the other hand, in our experiment, Soros could exploit his greater opportunity to be pivotal by attacking later. By the same token, ordinary speculators might attack earlier to avoid preemption by Soros.
The most direct evidence comes from defining the variable Shortfall from Pivotality,
Thus SP is the number of additional regular (mass=1) players it would take for the attack to succeed. Table 4 reports mean values of SP of 5.25 for regular players and 3.70 for Soros players when Soros has no informational advantage, and reports similar averages (if anything, a bit further apart) when Soros knows the strength of fundamentals but small speculators do not.
Thus in our experiment Soros attacks later than ordinary speculators. The second column reports direct effect estimates. The presence of either line increases the switching probability significantly, and a greater shortfall from pivotality decreases it. The third column allows for individual subject fixed effects and interactions. When both lines are visible, those estimates give slope -.34+.09+.13-.29 = -0.41 and intercept -2.80-.20-.18+1.18 = -2.00. Given the logit specification, the corresponding switch probability is exp (-2.00 -0.41SP) /(1+ exp(-2.00 -0.41SP)), about 12% when the player is pivotal (SP=0, essentially a measure of reaction time) and about 8% when only one more speculator is required for a successful attack (SP=1). The estimated probability falls below 1% when at least 7 more speculators are needed.
These coefficient estimates indicate that seeing both lines together has a much stronger effect than seeing either of them by itself: for the intercept, the direct effects (-.20, -.18) are at best marginally significant while the interaction (+1.18) is very significant, and for the slope estimates the interaction term (-0.29) again is the most significant and strongest term.
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The fourth column breaks apart the SP variable and looks at the separate effects of the threshold T(t) and the number of players B(t) currently in attack mode, as fractions of the total player mass M. Consistent with many of the theoretical models, the T(t) coefficient estimate indicates that individual players are significantly more likely to switch to attack mode when fundamentals are weaker. Switching to attack mode responds even more strongly to a larger number of players already in attack mode. The significant three way interactions in the fifth column once more show that seeing both lines together has an especially strong effect.
The other columns of Table 5 obtain parallel results for players already in attack mode. The direct effect estimates for SP again indicate that players are more likely to remain in attack mode when they have more information and when the attack is closer to success. The more refined specification in the next column obtains stronger direct effect estimates but relatively weak interaction estimates. The last column also shows a significantly stronger positive information effect for threshold but a marginally significant level effect of the wrong sign.
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Subsets of the data provide evidence on the robustness of two conditional predictions regarding transparency. Recall that Bannier and Heinemann (2005) conclude that greater transparency may encourage speculation in some circumstances when speculators believe that fundamentals are strong.
Their model, an extension of global games, doesn't translate precisely into our laboratory setup, but if their conclusion is very robust it would suggest that the positive DB and DT coefficient estimates in the second column of Table 5 are due to observations when T(t) is high. Figure 3 points to T(t)=0.8M as a natural breakpoint, since the success rate of speculative attacks in the full information condition first exceeds 50% and climbs sharply at this threshold. Restricting to T(t) ≥ 0.8M data, we obtain coefficient estimates -0.06 and 0.23**, smaller than the unrestricted estimates of 0.15** and 0.24** reported in the table. Thus the first conditional prediction is not supported in our data.
Recall that Bannier (2005) concludes that attacks are more likely with a larger and less well informed large player when beliefs about fundamentals are pessimistic, but the reverse holds when beliefs are optimistic. A rough translation into our data predicts higher attack rates by ordinary players in condition 5N-p (Soros has weight 5 and neither Soros nor regular players see the threshold line, and fundamentals are "pessimistic," T(t) < 0.8M) than in 3A-p (Soros has weight 3 and is the only one who sees the threshold line, and T(t) < 0.8M), and higher attack rates in 3A-o than in 5N-o (defined as before except with "optimistic" fundamentals T(t) ≥ 0.8M). The raw attack rates in our data are 3.2% in 5N-p versus 7.0% in 3A-p (contrary to the first part of the prediction) and are 2.9% in 3A-o versus 2.7% in 5N-o (consistent with the prediction but negligible). To control for information conditions and SP, one compares intercept coefficients the basic Switch to Attack Logit. The first comparison becomes negligible (log-odds 8
That sign reverts to its expected one but becomes insignificant in more refined estimates including higher order interactions and subject fixed effects. These estimates, excluded here to save space, are available from the authors. 
Discussion
Second and third generation models raise as many questions as they answer. What governs the timing of speculative attacks? What factors make attacks more or less frequent, and more or less likely to succeed?
The models, and the available field evidence, are either silent or inconsistent on these important matters.
The few existing laboratory studies use a simplified one-time, simultaneous-move setting that doesn't capture the dynamic nature of currency speculation.
Our laboratory experiment allows speculators to switch in and out of attack mode and lets the strength of fundamentals change in real time. It controls explanatory variables and so their impact on performance has a causal interpretation. Thus the experiment provides direct evidence on the models' predictive power in a simple dynamic setting, and offers a fresh perspective on field evidence.
The main results of the experiment can be summarized as follows.
1. Fundamentals. The probability of a successful attack indeed is a decreasing function of the strength of the fundamentals. The function appears to be continuous, not a jump from 0 to 1 as in some models. For example, a deterioration of the fundamentals from 90 to 80 (percent of potential speculation required to force a devaluation) doubles the probability of a successful attack in our data.
2. Information. Successful attacks are more likely and come sooner when speculators have information about the strength of fundamentals and about the activities of other speculators. In our symmetric data, for example, providing precise public information about net speculative positions shortens the average time to devaluation by about 15%, and providing precise public information about the fundamentals has a very similar effect. The effects persist even with weaker fundamentals and with less precise information.
Asymmetries.
The mere presence of a speculator with larger mass ("Soros") increases the probability of a successful attack and hastens its onset; e.g., the time to success decreases by almost 30%.
Consistent with some theory, giving the large speculator increased size does not significantly strengthen his impact in our data. Contrary to some theory, giving him better information seems to have little impact, and in our experiment the large speculators tend to attack later than ordinary speculators.
Coordination.
Speculators are more likely to switch into (and less likely to switch out of) attack mode when they are nearer to being pivotal, e.g., when fundamentals are weaker or more speculators are already in attack mode. The effect is enhanced by information about fundamentals and speculative activity.
Of course, the laboratory results should not be translated directly into policy recommendations, but they should sharpen subsequent theoretical and empirical research and thus improve policy indirectly. For example, part of result 3 seems inconsistent with surveys of foreign exchange dealers, who say that the two most important advantages possessed by large traders are a "large customer base" and "better information" about the market (Cheung and Wong, 2000; Cheung and Chinn, 2001; and Cheung, Chinn and Marsh, 2004) . 9 Future empirical work, both laboratory and field, should resolve the inconsistency and point to appropriate policy.
Another example is the second result that better information about fundamentals encourages speculative attacks and makes success more likely. As noted, this conclusion seems to contradict conventional wisdom, some theoretical models, and one piece of field data. In our experiment, the strength of fundamentals is, by design, independent of what information is available. The two variables might be correlated in field data. Indeed, the central bank might strategically increase or decrease the availability of information, and from a decrease speculators might infer that fundamentals are weak. If this strategic effect is sufficiently strong, it could account for the conventional result and its very different policy implications. One way to pursue the question is to conduct laboratory experiments with information controlled by a player in the role of a central bank. The baseline results of our completed experiment would allow clear inferences about the strategic effect.
To conclude, experimental methods have made useful contributions to many theoretical and applied fields of economics in the last ten or twenty years, but have hardly touched international finance. We believe that the work reported here offers evidence that is complementary to both field studies and theoretical models, and we hope that it encourages greater cross fertilization.
9
Wei and Kim (1997) find a very weak association between big players' position and the subsequent currency movement, and infer that large players do not generally have better information.
Note: The table and subsequent analysis excludes practice periods, the first 5 periods in each session, periods not related to speculative attacks, and 16 periods in which the attack was not feasible. The sessions after 10/13/04 include only the extreme information treatments (sharp lines or none) regarding fundamentals and speculative activity, while the prior sessions also include the intermediate (thick line) treatments. The threshold (grey line) falls to 0.5 (6.5) after 45 seconds. There were 9 human players, but player 4 had a weight of 5 in this period. No player saw any of the lines in this period.
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Grey line 
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The success rate at threshold x is defined as S(x)/[S(x)+U(x)], where S(x) = number of periods where an attack succeeded at a threshold at or above x, and U(x) = number of periods where the threshold declined to x without a successful attack. The horizontal axis is the threshold T as a fraction of the mass M of players. The treatment dummies DB and DT =1 (resp. =0) indicate that players observe (resp. do not observe) the number of attackers and the threshold. 
